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ZERO-SUM MADISON
Thomas W. Merrill*

PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM. By Jennifer Nedelsky. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
1990. Pp. xiii, 343. $29.95.
Has the fabric of American constitutional law been permanently
"distorted" by the Framers' preoccupation with protecting private
property against redistribution? Jennifer Nedelsky 1 thinks so. In this
provocative study of how the idea of property shaped the political
thought of the Framers and the institutions they designed, she argues
that James Madison's constitutional philosophy was driven by fear
that a future propertyless majority would seek to expropriate the holdings of a minority. To combat this danger, Madison sought to create a
structure of government that would ensure the dominance of the propertied elite. Madison's obsessive fear of redistribution spread to the
newly created federal judiciary, which elevated private property to the
status of a legal "boundary" limiting the political power of majorities.
Although judicial protection of property has waned in recent decades,
Nedelsky believes that Madison's legacy continues to limit our ability
to construct a more egalitarian and participatory constitutional order.
Nedelsky's thesis suffers from a double hyperbole: she both overstates and understates the role of property in American public life. In
explaining the past, she overstates the extent to which a constitutionalized property has served as a barrier to a more communitarian or egalitarian polity. Indeed, much of her analysis rests on a play on what it
means to "redistribute property." Although the historical record
reveals that Madison wanted the Constitution to protect specific rights
in property and contract from retroactive impairment, it does not support the far more drastic proposition that Madison thought property
in the sense of shares of general wealth should be frozen. The dominant pattern in judicial protection of property has similarly been to
require government compensation for interference with "distinct investment-backed expectations,"2 but not to bar efforts to redistribute
general wealth. Thus, constitutionalized property has at most impeded attempts at targeted interference; it has not posed any barrier to
systemic redistribution.
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University. B.A. 1971, Grinnell College; B.A. 1973, Oxford University; J.D. 1977, University of Chicago. - Ed.
1. Associate Professor of Law and Political Science, University of Toronto.
2. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978).
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In the evaluative chapter that concludes the book (pp. 203-76), on
the other hand, Nedelsky badly understates the positive contributions
private property makes, especially its role in generating greater material wealth. This chapter is devoid of any acknowledgment of the
powerful utilitarian case for a system of private property. The omission is especially glaring given that utilitarian considerations weighed
heavily in the minds of Madison and his fellow Federalists as they
tried to correct the deficiencies of the Articles of Confederation.
Nedelsky's failure to consider the additional material prosperity introduced by a system of private property means that, if anything, her own
account of the Madisonian Constitution is "distorted": constitutional
protection for private property is far easier to attack in a zero-sum
society than in a world where private property creates incentives that
encourage a better life for all. A more balanced assessment would
view property as a more modest barrier to majoritarian action and
more generously credit the institution's positive contributions.
I

Nedelsky tells a story that is carefully developed, attentively detailed, and thoughtfully supported. Especially in the foundational
chapters devoted to the political thought of Madison (pp. 16-66) and
two other prominent Federalists - Gouverneur Morris (pp. 67-95)
and James Wilson (pp. 96-140) - she presents a richly textured account of the Federalist understanding of property and its relation to
democratic theory. What follows is necessarily a simplified version of
her argument, designed to highlight my points of disagreement.
In Nedelsky's view, the single most important aspect of Madison's
political philosophy - and the key to understanding the undemocratic features of our Constitution - is the little-known fact that he
was a Malthusian (pp. 18, 33-34, 54-55). Madison believed that as the
population of America grew and the vast expanses of the West filled
up, eventually large numbers of people would be forced off the land
into positions of wage labor. 3 Competition among these landless laborers would drive wages down to the point where "a great majority of
the people will not only be without landed, but any other sort of,
property. " 4
Given this gloomy prospect, Madison foresaw serious conflict
ahead between the political rights of the propertyless majority and the
civil rights of minorities, especially their right to private property.
Sooner or later, the majority would seek to use its political power to
3. See Letter from James Madison to Nicholas P. Trist (Jan. 29, 1828), reprinted in MARVIN
MEYERS, THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER 453-55 (1973) (criticizing utopian communities such as
Owen's New Harmony for overlooking the Malthusian dynamic).
4. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CoNVENTION OF 1787, at 203-04 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911) (statement by Madison).
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plunder the property of the wealthy few. Nedelsky suggests that
Madison was particularly concerned about the expropriatory yearnings of the future Malthusian mob because he thought it would spell
the doom of all civil liberties (p. 38). Madison believed that unequal
shares of property resulted ultimately from unequal faculties for obtaining property (such as intelligence and industry) (pp. 28-29), and
thus egalitarian redistribution could be achieved only by suppressing
free exercise of the faculties themselves (p. 38).
In one of the book's strongest sections, Nedelsky develops the various strategies that Madison might have adopted for staving off the
confrontation between majority rule and private property (pp. 141-63).
Madison's solution, according to Nedelsky, was to try to rig the rules
of majoritarian politics under the Constitution to ensure that those
who actually ruled would be members of the property-owning elite
(pp. 50-52). This explains Madison's desire for property qualifications
for electors to the Senate, his endorsement of a Council of Revision
composed in part of unelected judges, and his development of theories
of horizontally and vertically divided and checked government in order to filter and dilute majority will. Madison believed that as long as
the propertied minority enjoyed disproportionate influence in the
political arena of the new Republic, they would guard against the folly
of seeking to undermine the security of property rights.
Nedelsky points out that other strategies were available to
Madison. Gouverneur Morris, who was less of a democrat than
Madison, wanted to check not only the future propertyless majority
but also the propertied elite. Otherwise, the danger of majority tyranny would be avoided only at the cost of minority tyranny. Madison
was so focused on the danger of majority expropriation, however, that
he gave insufficient attention to this possibility in 1787. James Wilson,
on the other hand, was more optimistic about the future of democracy,
and wanted to encourage greater participation in government by all
citizens. Active participation would lead to a greater sense of responsibility, which in the long run would provide greater security for property. Obsessed with the image of the future majority as a hungry mob,
Madison failed to consider this path as well, opting instead for a government structured to encourage political apathy. Thus, the Madisonian solution contained within it the seeds of what Nedelsky sees as
the major failing of modem constitutionalism: its hostility towards
measures designed to promote more equality and a more genuinely
participatory democracy.
Nedelsky acknowledges but does not highlight two immediate difficulties in showing that Madison's political philosophy (as she has depicted it) played a dominating role in American constitutionalism.
First, Madison's Malthusian premise turned out to be false. Although
there has always been considerable inequality in property ownership in
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America, the grim vision of a permanent propertyless majority never
materialized (p. 331 n.188). Second, Madison's strategy for meeting
the imagined Malthusian danger was never implemented in its intended form. The Convention rejected some Madisonian devices to
ensure rule by a propertied elite - such as a property qualification for
electors to the Senate (pp. 56-57, 303 n.5); others went by the board as
the franchise and tenets· of populist democracy expanded throughout
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Notwithstanding these difficulties, Nedelsky argues that "the primacy of the Federalist concern with protecting property so shaped the
structure of the Constitution that it was characterized.as much by this
implicit priority as by the absence of its formal institutionalization" (p.
7). The Madisonian obsession lived on, she argues, largely through
the development of the institution of judicial review. The Federalist
judiciary divided the issues of public life into the conceptual realms of
politics and law, granting themselves final say over the latter. Property rights, which enjoyed "the sanction of the long and honorable
tradition of common law" (p. 8), quickly became a legally enforced
limit on the power of democratic government. The phenomenon initially emerged through aggressive enforcement of the Contracts
Clause5 and later expanded through a Lochner-ized due process. 6
Ironically therefore, although Madison himself opposed judicial review (p. 59), it was the device through which his fear of majoritarian
redistribution was perpetuated for the first 150 years under the American Constitution.
At this point in Nedelsky's story, another obvious difficulty develops: in the late 1930s the Court abandoned Lochner, and has made no
systematic effort to revive it (at least with respect to property rights)
since that time. While Nedelsky acknowledges this (p. 225), sheargues that the Madisonian-Lochnerian legacy continues to rule us from
the grave. In fact, she believes the preoccupation with protecting
property against majoritarian redistribution has permanently "distorted" constitutional discourse in a number of ways. Because of the
Madisonian legacy, we tend to think of constitutional rights as inherently unequal (like property) rather than capable of enjoyment by all
(pp. 245-46). Additionally, Madison's efforts to impose filters on the
vox populi through federalism and separation of powers generated our
"shallow conception" of democracy (p. 1), minimizing the potential
for participation in government by all segments of society. Finally,
our chronic tendency to view private property as the paradigm of constitutional rights has stymied efforts to find a new foundation for constitutional protection of interests in personal autonomy - a
5. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 10.
6. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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foundation that would be more congenial to claims of egalitarian redistribution {pp. 272-76).
II
Numerous problems beset Nedelsky's reconstruction of Madison's
views about property and their influence on American constitutionalism. 7 Probably the principal defect is that she mistakenly conflates
two very different positions regarding constitutional protection of
property: (1) that specific rights in property should be protected
against majority interference, and (2) that relative shares of general
wealth should be insulated from collective redistribution. Madison
clearly agreed with the former proposition, but I think it most unlikely
that he would have endorsed the latter. By treating these two propositions as equivalent, Nedelsky has in effect transformed Madison into
Stephen Field8 - or Richard Epstein. 9 She has also erroneously portrayed what is in effect a minority position in American constitutional
law (the Field-Epstein strict antiredistribution view) as the main line.
Without a doubt, Madison wanted to protect specific rights in
property and contract. He endorsed the Contracts Clause - prohibiting the states from impairing the obligation of contracts - on the
ground that it would help "inspire a general prudence and industry,
and give a regular course to the business of society." 10 And he is generally credited as the author of the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment - barring the federal government from taking private
property for public use without just compensation (p. 308 n.56). But
no evidence exists that Madison harbored similar hostility toward
measures that would redistribute relative shares of fungible wealth.
Madison favored abolition of the entail in Virginia {p. 285 n.53) and
7. Two problems of misplaced emphasis should be briefly noted. First, Nedelsky gives insuf·
ficient attention to Madison's concerns about conflicts between different classes of property hold·
ers - debtor versus creditor, agrarian versus manufacturing, slaveholder versus independent
farmer. These concerns probably weighed more heavily on his mind than any concerns about
rich versus poor. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison); James Madison, Draft
Letter on Majority Governments Dated 1833, reprinted in MEYERS, supra note 3, at 521-30.
Second, Nedelsky should have done more to acknowledge Madison's strong commitment to freedom of speech and religion as well as property. In this regard, I agree with Nedelsky that
Madison's 1792 essay entitled Property, id. at 243, is uncharacteristic in defining property very
broadly to include what we would call civil rights. But in asserting that every "man has a prop·
erty in his opinions and the free communication of them," and "a property of peculiar value in
his religious opinions, and in the profession and practice dictated by them," id., Madison was
making the point that freedom of speech and religion were just as important as the right to
property. By downplaying Madison's commitment to these other rights, Nedelsky makes him
seem excessively single-minded.
8. Justice Field was the foremost advocate of the doctrine of substantive due process in the
period leading up to Lochner. See JAMES W. ELY, THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT
86-87, 92, 99 (1992).
9. See RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985).
10. THE FEDERALISf No. 44 (James Madison).
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spoke favorably of other reforms in the laws of inheritance that would
tend to equalize the distribution of property over time (p. 39). As
Nedelsky admits, "[p]oor laws were common in most states, including
Virginia, and we have some reason to believe that Madison approved
of such institutions" (p. 44). She also quotes Madison as having once
expressed the· view that France could benefit from "a more equal partition of property" (p. 34).
More direct evidence of his attitude is provided by his 1792 essay
Parties, where Madison wrote that the evil of party factions should be
combatted by, among other things, "the silent operation of laws,
which, without violating the rights ofproperty, reduce extreme wealth
towards a state of mediocrity." 11 Here we see Madison relying on the
very distinction Nedelsky repeatedly ignores - between "rights of
property" (not to be violated) and measures to reduce extremes in
wealth (to be encouraged).
Perhaps the strongest reason to doubt Nedelsky's equating specific
property rights with general wealth, however, is that it would have
been illogical for Madison to oppose general wealth redistribution,
given the premises of his political thought as Nedelsky portrays them.
Madison believed in economic growth: he wanted a government that
would encourage agricultural improvements, advances in manufacturing, and more trade and commerce, all of which he regarded as promoting the "public good" (pp. 42-43). Yet at several junctures in his
life Madison also voiced a Malthusian pessimism: no amount of
growth could keep up with the demands of a burgeoning population,
so that over time more and more Americans would be without any
property.
Given these twin premises - a belief that the size of the pie could
be expanded together with a belief that the distribution of the pie
would eventually become so skewed as to threaten the very fabric of
society - Madison could not sensibly oppose all forms of redistribution. Instead, one would expect Madison to endorse both economic
growth and wealth redistribution (as long as measures to achieve one
goal would not frustrate the other), because both measures would
work to postpone the day of the Malthusian Armageddon. The most
plausible position for realizing this dual strategy would be to secure
existing entitlements against retroactive impairment - thereby stimulating investment and economic growth - while encouraging measures that would work over time to promote greater equality in wealth.
Nedelsky cites no evidence suggesting this was not in fact Madison's
position. 12
11. P. 45 (quoting James Madison, Parties, in 6 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 86
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906)) (emphasis added).
12. When listing examples of the evils of factions, Madison spoke of "a rage for paper money,
for an abolition of debts, [or] for an equal division of property ...." THE FEDERALIST, supra
note 7, at 112. But I would not equate "an equal division of property,'' i.e., pure socialism, with
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By and large, our constitutional history has followed the same
strategy: we protect specific contract and property rights against retrospective interference but do not recognize any permanent or general
barriers to wealth redistribution. Consider, for example, the Contracts
Clause. It is true, as Nedelsky argues, that the Federalist judiciary
adopted an expansive interpretation of the Contracts Clause, reading it
to cover much that could be regarded as property. 13 But in the watershed case of Ogden v. Saunders, 14 the Court limited the clause to the
protection of previously negotiated contract rights, holding that it did
not bar prospective legislation such as bankruptcy laws designed to
mitigate hardship for future insolvent debtors. A reading of the Constitution that would proscribe all attempts at wealth redistribution
would presumably reach the opposite conclusion. ts
Similarly, Madison's Takings Clause has always been understood
to apply only to interference with rights in specific property. 16 The
Clause requires the government to pay just compensation when it condemns, seizes, or destroys identifiable property. It also requires just
compensation when the government adopts a regulation of property
that has the effect of "appropriating or destroying it." 17 But the Court
has consistently rejected takings challenges to general price regulations, 18 zoning regulations, 19 or systems of taxation. 20 This is again
contrary to what one would expect if the Constitution truly enjoined
measures designed to achieve a "more equal" division, which Madison endorsed. Nedelsky also
notes that Jefferson once wrote Madison proposing an equal division of property among siblings
upon death ofa parent and a system of progressive taxation, and that Madison did not reply. P.
33. She infers from Madison's failure to respond that he disapproved of these ideas, but she cites
no direct evidence supporting such a conclusion. P. 285 n.51.
13. Pp. 194-95. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (Contracts Clause prohibits state interference with completed grant of real property); Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (Contracts Clause protects corporate charter).
14. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827). Nedelsky does not cite the case.
15. See Richard Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV.
703, 723-30 (1984) (arguing that Ogden was wrongly decided and that prospective interferences
with freedom of contract should be construed to violate the clause).
16. The Takings Clause has in fact been of limited significance throughout most of our history. The Supreme Court held in Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), that the
clause applied only to the federal government, and not until late in the nineteenth century did the
Court find that the principles of the clause applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897). Even as applied to
the federal government, not until 1946 did the Court clearly establish that federal sovereign
immunity had been waived for suits alleging a taking of property. United States v. Causby, 328
U.S. 256 (1946). See JOHN M. STEADMAN ET AL., LmGATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERN·
MENT 225-26 (2d ed. 1983).
17. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922).
18. See Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135 (1921) (rent controls).
19. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
20. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (dictum); cf.
United States v. Sperry Corp., 493 U.S. 52 (1989) (rejecting takings challenge to imposition of a
user fee on persons litigating claims before the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal).
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all forms of wealth redistribution. 21
Even in the area of procedural due process protections for property, we see a similar pattern. In an important pair of cases decided
early in this century, the Court held that a due process hearing was
required where "[a] relatively small number of persons was concerned,
who were exceptionally affected, in each case upon individual
grounds." 22 But where the question involved establishing a general
schedule of tax rates applicable to large numbers of similarly situated
individuals, "[t]heir rights are protected in the only way that they can
be in a complex society, by their power, immediate or remote, over
those who make the rule." 23 Thus, the Due Process Clause, like the
Contracts and Takings Clauses, applies to targeted intrusions, not
wholesale redistribution.
To be sure, the substantive due process jurisprudence of Lochner
can be seen as reflecting a general hostility toward redistributive legislation, even where the law operates prospectively and thus cannot be
said to interfere with specific, preexisting entitlements. But Lochner
had a much narrower scope of operation than is often assumed. For
the most part, its theory was confined to statutes that precluded parties to a contractual relationship, such as employers and employees,
from bargaining over specific terms. 24 Substantive due process was
never applied to prohibit progressive taxation, public assistance laws,
or any other general redistributive legislation. And even in the employer-employee context, the Court often upheld statutes where it perceived that employees did not enjoy equal bargaining power. 25 In any
event, the Lochner era lasted only forty years and is now thoroughly
repudiated.
In sum, Nedelsky significantly overstates the degree to which the
Constitution, either in its original design or in its evolved understanding, has served to entrench the ~xisting distribution of wealth. The
main line in American constitutional history, from James Madison to
the present, has been to offer a measure of constitutional protection for
specific entitlements in property but not to freeze relative shares of
wealth. By conflating these two positions, Nedelsky has painted a picture of a constitutional tradition far more hostile to egalitarian redis21. Richard Epstein, who believes that the Constitution ought to incorporate such a principle, accordingly argues that the Takings Clause should be construed to prohibit progressive taxation and other forms of redistribution. EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 295-303.
22. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 446 (1915) (characterizing the holding in Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908)).
23. 239 U.S. at 445.
24. See Aviam Soifer, The Paradox of Paternalism and Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism:
United States Supreme Court, 1888-1921, 5 LAW & HIST. REv. 249, 274 (1987) (describing tension between paternalism and anti-redistribution theme during Lachner era).
25. E.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (minimum hours for women); Holden v.
Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898) (minimum hours for miners).
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tribution than the one we have. If Americans have not sought to
legislate socialism, it is because the political consensus for such a solution does not exist. It is not because of the legacy of Mr. Madison or
because of any legal barriers found in the Constitution.

III
If Nedelsky overstates the degree of constitutional protection given
to property in the analytical portion of the book, she is guilty of understating the contributions of property when she puts an evaluative spin
on that analysis in the concluding chapter. In common with other
recent works on property rights by left-leaning American academics, 26
Nedelsky's normative analysis is concerned exclusively with issues of
distributive justice - how we cut the pie. Nedelsky ignores the possibility that the institution of private property might have something to
do with the size of the pie, and hence with the well-being of those who
receive even the smallest slices, whatever the distributional principle.
In effect, she evaluates the Madisonian legacy (in the overblown form
in which she presents it) against an implicit assumption of a zero-sum
society. Not surprisingly, a private property regime looks quite unfair
on such assumptions: those with property get much larger slices of the
pie than those without, just because they already have property. The
only decent thing to do is to start redistributing.
This focus on distributive justice gives rise to a number of ironies.
One is that Madison and his compatriots surely did not believe in a
zero-sum society, as Nedelsky herself admits (p. 42). Indeed, in the
analytical part of the book, Nedelsky acknowledges that Madison
wanted to protect property in part to promote economic growth what he called the "public good." The Madison we encounter in the
analytical pages is a complex figure who believes in an expanding pie
but frets about a Malthusian future in which a majority hold only minuscule slices. When it comes to evaluating the Madisonian legacy,
however, the pro-growth theme drops from sight and we are left with
nothing but the demand of a minority (the rich) for protection against
a majority (the poor). Needless to say, in a such zero-sum world it is
hard to find kind words for a Constitution that forbids any redistribution of wealth.
At only one point in the book does Nedelsky seek to justify her
disregard of the wealth-generating potential of private property. She
acknowledges that if Madison were right about the sanctity of private
property as necessary to "promote the public good of all," then "most
of the criticisms I have outlined would fall or at least pale before
them" (p. 168). In reply to this challenge, she asserts that in order to
26. See, e.g., STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY (1990); JEREMY WALDRON,
THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (1988). I make a similar point about Munzer's work in
Thomas W. Merrill, Wealth and Property, 38 UCLA L. REv. 489, 495 (1990) (book review).
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believe Madison was right, "[w]e must accept both the claim that attempts at redistribution will make those at the bottom worse off and
the claim that they will not be capable of seeing this 'truth' for themselves. If either claim fails, the moral foundation for Madisonian elite
rule crumbles" (pp. 168-69). This response rests on the same equivocation previously noted: Nedelsky equates Madison's support for specific investments in property (needed to promote "the public good,"
i.e., a larger pie) with a policy against all wealth redistribution. To
imagine that "those at the bottom" are made worse off by progressive
rates of taxation and transfer payments, and that they cannot see this
themselves, is indeed implausible. But this does not mean that "those
at the bottom" would be better off if we abolished private property or
even if we did away with the Due Process and Takings Clauses. The
poorest Americans may not want to eliminate redistribution, but they
are not lining up to flee to Cuba either.
Which brings me to a second irony. Shortly after Nedelsky published her book, private property had the best year in its history. During 1991, the world watched transfixed as the former communist states
of eastern Europe turned from collectivist to market-oriented regimes
and then communist rule collapsed even in the Soviet Union. The
phenomenon of a capitalist revolution would be utterly unfathomable
to one whose understanding of private property was limited to a study
of Nedelsky's book. Implicit in Nedelsky's account of our own experience is that democratic majorities in America, if liberated from the
"distorting" effects of a Madisonian constitutional heritage, would opt
for a more collectivist and egalitarian society. One schooled on this
premise would predict that if democratic majorities in other countries
- countries happily spared from these "distorting" influences - were
suddenly freed from a dominating occupational force, they would
adopt as their first priority guidelines for the proper distribution of
wealth.
Not so. They want private property. Indeed, at least some of them
want to make property a constitutional right. 27 The reasons for this
are hardly obscure. A system of private property promises more
goods, more jobs, more variety, more recreational and associational
choices, more attractive communities, more economic growth - in a
word, a larger pie.28 The former communist regimes want private
property for all the reasons Nedelsky ignores in the latter part of her
book. This does not mean the Commonwealth of Independent States
and the new republics of eastern Europe will replicate the same distri27. See. e.g., Wiktor Osiatynski, Revolutions in Eastern Europe, 58 U. Clu. L. REv. 823, 824
(1991) (noting that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and Slovak Republic have begun to return
property confiscated 45 years ago); Symposium, Panel L· Property Rights and the New Legal
Order, 21 CUMB. L. REV. 447, 448-51 (1991) (panel discussion) (comments of Pavel Bratinka).
28. See EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 3-6.
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bution of wealth or the same balance between public and private sectors found in the United States. But as I have argued, the choice of a
private property regime is to a significant degree independent of decisions about the distribution of wealth. Madison would have understood last year's events very well. Nedelsky must be utterly mystified.
IV

The ultimate message ofNedelsky's book is that private property is
a social institution, collectively defined and collectively enforced. She
believes the concept of property as something natural and prepolitical
and immune from ordinary democratic processes is at best incoherent
and at worst pernicious. The idea that property has some timeless,
"correct" definition that courts can ascertain and enforce against the
popular will is belied by the fact that the idea of property has "disintegrated. "29 And attempts throughout our history to insulate property from majoritarian processes - whether Madison's design for a
structural Constitution that would ensure rule by the propertied elite
or Lochner's strategy of-a judicially enforced protective boundary
around property rights - have only "distorted" the process of collective self-determination, preventing the people from defining this social
institution in the way they mutually conclude to be for the best of all.
Property is of course a social institution, not a natural right. But
there is no inherent contradiction, as Nedelsky seems to believe there
is, between the idea that property is a social institution and the idea
that the law - another social institution - should protect reliance
interests associated with specific property rights. Property is a social
institution in the sense that it emerges from customary forms of interaction among people with respect to specific material resources, 30 and
29. The idea that the concept of private property has "disintegrated" plays only a marginal
role in Nedelsky's book, and hence warrants only a footnote. Nedelsky borrows this conceit
from Thomas Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in XXII NoMOS: PROPERTY 69 (J. Roland
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980), and supports it with reference to Frank Michelman's
discussion of the Supreme Court's all-things-considered understanding of the distinction between
a regulation and a taking of property. Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987. 88 COLUM. L. REV.
1600 (1988). But the fact that there are hard cases at the margins of the takings doctrine hardly
supports the claim that a legal institution has "disintegrated." Private property, in the everyday
sense of the right to possess, exclude others, and transfer identified material resources, is nonproblematic in the vast majority of transactions in which the concept is applied.
The notion that property has "disintegrated" is also belied by Nedelsky's own theory that
"the image of property as natural, neutral, and apolitical or 'nonstate-like' " continues to define
what counts as governmental interference and "who will get constitutional protection for what."
Pp. 259-60. In effect, Nedelsky tries to have it both ways. She argues that property has disintegrated and thus cannot serve as a judicially defined boundary. But at the same time she
believes that property continues to have a "mythic power'' that defines the boundaries of political
discourse. P. 246. If property did not continue to reflect some commonsense core of meaning, it
could hardly continue to exert such a powerful influence over the legal mind.
30. See ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
167-68 (1991) (reviewed in this issue by Professor David Friedman. - Ed.); John Umbeck, A
Theory of Contract Choice and the California Gold Rush, 20 J. LAW & EcoN. 421 (1977); cf.
Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 51 AM. EcoN. REv. 347 (1967) (describ-
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then is defined and protected against private interference by state
law. 31 The constitutional protection of property is also a social institution, but it involves a different source of law (the federal Constitution
rather than state law), different institutional actors (ultimately the federal courts), and different objectives (protecting specific entitlements
against public rather than private interference). Thus, the fact that
both processes are "social" does not mean that they collapse into a
single undifferentiated mass. Moreover, neither the social origins of
property as an institution, nor the social nature of the constitutional
protections we recognize, tells us much about what collective measures may be adopted (at either the state or the federal level) to reallocate relative shares of fungible wealth. We are fortunate that the
Founders of our nation, most prominently James Madison, understood these distinctions. What is puzzling is that so many contemporary American academics would like to obscure them.

ing an economic theory of why informal property rights emerge in primitive societies in response
to external changes that effect the value of material resources).
31. See Board ofR:egents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).

